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[Crim. No. 5648.
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Mar. 15, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JACK SYKES, Appellant.
[1] Crimina.! Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-Plan or Scheme.Generally, evidence to show plan or scheme concerns means
used to gain end, such as theft of pistol before attack on
person.
[2] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor in violation of
Health & Safe Code, § 11714, testimony that minor had been
recruited as prostitute by defendant, while involving use of
ends to prove means, is relevant to prove motive regardless
of whether it is admissible to show plan or scheme.
[3] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-When Admissible.Test for admissibility of evidence is whether it tends logically,
naturally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact
material for the People, or to overcome any material matter
sought to be proved by defense, and if so it is admissible
regardless of whether it embraces commission of another crime
or whether other crime be similar in kind or part of single
design.
[4] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor, motive is material
fact, and evidence of prosecutrix' relationship with defendant
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 36 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 136 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 310 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 393,9); [2, 4, 6]
Poisons, § 14; [3] Criminal Law, § 393(1); [5, 8] Poisons, § 16.1;
[7] Witnesses, § 120(2); [9] Witnesses, §§ 244,260; [10] Criminal
Law, § 1378; (11] Criminal Law, § 110L
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in connection with prostitution and sharing of its proceeds
with him is admissible as bearing on his motive in giving
marijuana to her without receiving payment.
[6] Id.-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal.-In prosecution
for furnishing marijuana to minor, failure of defendant to
object to testimony that he gave prosecutrix second opportunity
to smoke marijuana cigarette on night following one on which
crime charged was alleged to have been committed precludes
him from complaining on appeal that he was prejudiced.
[6] Id.-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Evidence.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor, evidence of similar
conduct of defendant ,,:ith same person who is named in
indictment is admissible to show disposition of defendant to
commit act charged and probability of his having committed it.
[7] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases.
-Where defendant is charged with giving narcotics to minor
and repeatedly denies in broad terms commIssion of crime,
he may be asked on cross-examination if he ever had narcotics
in his possession, evidence of possession of narcotics at prior
times being admissible to show familiarity with them.
[8] Poisons-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor, admission of testimony
by third person that he stole heroin from defendant was
harmless where only effect such evidence could have against
defendant was to show previous possession of narcotics by
him, and where such possession had been admitted by him in
previous testimony.
[9] Witnesses-Impeachment-Inconsistent Statements-Laying
Foundation.-Police officer and prosecuting attorney cannot be
asked about prior inconsistent statements of witness until
foundation questions have been asked of witness (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2052), and if he admits inconsistent statements it is
error to introduce other evidence of them.
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Impeachment.-In prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor,
where witness was asked on cross-examination by defendant's
counsel if he wished to explain why he had stated to prosecuting attorney that he had given marijuana cigarette to defendant
or minor, and witness then related events leading to his plea
of guilty, attempting to show that such statement was part
of transaction in which he was induced to plead guilty to
charge of furnishing marijuana to minor in order to escape
prosecution on other charges, defendant is precluded from
complaining on appeal that he was prejudiced by such witness
being asked whether he had pleaded guilty to such charge.
[11] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of Counsel.-Failure to
object to statements of district attorney dUl'ing his ar~ent
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or to request instruction to jury to disregard argument constitutes waiver of objection to challenged statements, and misconduct, if any, will not warrant reversal.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Melvin I. Cronin, Judge.
Affirmed.
Prosecution for furnishing marijuana to minor in violation
of Health & Safe Code, § 11714. Judgment of conviction
affirmed.
Sol A. Abrams and George E. Hammer for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-The appeal of Jack Sykes, who with Rudy
Mercado, was indicted for furnishing marijuana to Beverly
Detrick, a minor, is from the judgment of conviction of the
crime of violating section 11714 of the Health and Safety
Code.
Beverly Detrick, 17 years of age, testified that while she
was sitting in a cafe, Sykes entered, took a marijuana cigarette from his pocket, and handed it to Mercado. After
Mercado lighted the cigarette, he handed it to Beverly. She
smoked it and gave it back to Mercado who returned it to
Sykes. Sykes smoked it and then passed it back to Mercado,
who again smoked it before passing it on to the others seated
ai'ound the booth. It was then returned to Sykes. Beverly
testified that while the cigarette was being passed around,
Mercado and Sykes were saying, "Keep it down so no one can
see it."
Beverly further testified that on the following evening,
while riding in a taxicab driven by Sykes, he handed her
another marijuana cigarette. This, she said, was in the
presence of a perSOll named lilrank or Eddie. When crossexamined she testified that Jesus Gonzales, whom she knew
as Frank Cruz, was not present on either occasion. Upon
redirect examination she declared that Jesus Gonzales was
the man in the taxicab who gave her the cigarette. Gonzales
denied knowing Beverly at the time she said he was with her.
Beverly testified that she was introduced to Sykes sometime in the third week in March by Mercado, with whom ahe
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was living at the time. Over objection, Beverly testified at
great length that she had been recruited as a prostitute by
Sykes, to whom she paid one-half of her income. She further
testified that they had discussed the rates she should charge
and how to detect venereal disease. He took her to hotels
and suggested false names for her to use in registering.
Other testimony by Beverly was that she had smoked marijuana cigarettes 28 or 29 times previous to the evening
Sykes offered one to her. She described the cigarette offered
to her. She was familiar with the odor of marijuana, she
said, and smoking the cigarette that night made her feel
U a little high."
Beverly said that she had never paid any
money to Sykes for marijuana.
Inspector Maloney, a qualified expert on narcotics, testified
that her actions and terminology were typical of one who had
smoked a marijuana cigarette and her description of marijuana was correct. The method of smoking described by
Beverly, the inspector said, was typical as well as the practice
of passing of the cigarette from one person to another.
Mercado's testimony was that Sykes did not give him a
marijuana cigarette at the cafe. The prosecution claimed surprise and asked to impeach the witness. Over objection,
Mercado was asked if he had not pleaded guilty to the crime
charged in the indictment. The district attorney also questioned him about the circumstances surrounding the plea
and prior inconsistent statements made at that time. In
answer to other questions over objection, Mercado admitted
the theft of some heroin from Sykes and the previous possession of narcotics.
Sykes contends that the court erred in admitting Beverly's
testimony about her conduct as a prostitute under the direction of Sykes and also her charge that he gave her a cigarette on the night after they were in the cafe. The testimony of Sykes on cross-examination as to his previous possession of narcotics and the admission of Mercado that he
had stolen narcotics from Sykes is also said to justify reversal of the judgment of conviction. Another contention
is that the district attorney made prejudicial remarks to the
jury during his opening and closing arguments by repeated
reference to the alleged pimping and narcotic activities of
Sykes. The prosecution failed to prove all of the elements
of the crime charged, he says, and the evidence is not sufficient
to support the convictiop..
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The attorney-general argues that the testimony by Beverly
and the crocs-examination of Sykes insofar as they touched
on prostitution was admissible to show the plan, scheme or
motive of Sykes. As such it is, the state asserts, an exception to the general rule that evidence of other crimes or
immoral conduct is not admissible.
The theory of the prosecution is that Sykes carried on
a complete plan to subjugate the mind and body of Beverly
to his vile ends. [1] Generally, evidence to show a plan or
scheme concerns the means used to gain an end, such as the
theft of a pistol before an attack upon a person. [2] Here,
the district attorney used the ends to prove the means. It
is not necessary to decide whether such evidence shows plan
or scheme, because it was relevant to prove motive. [3] The
test for admissibility is: "does it tend logically, naturally,
and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material
for the people, or to overcome any material matter sought to
be proved by the defense' If it does, then it is admissible,
whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does
not, whether the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether
it be part of a single design or not." (People v. Peete, 28
Ca1.2d 306, 315 [169 P.2d 924]; also see: People v. Dabb,
32 Cal.2d 491 [197 P.2d 1] ; People v. James, 65 Cal.App.2d
709, 710 [151 P.2d 572].)
[4] Motive is a material fact. Evidence was offered that
Beverly at no time paid Sykes for any narcotic. There is
reason to believe that he was motivated in giving it to
her because of their relationship in connection with prostitution and the sharing of its proceeds with him. EVidence of
this relationship with her was, therefore, admissible.
[5] No objection was made to the testimony of Beverly
that Sykes gave her a second opportunity to smoke a marijuana cigarette on the night following the one on which
the crime charged was alleged to have been committed. On
cross-examination, a vigorous attack was made on this testimony. Having failed to object, Sykes cannot now complain
that he was prejudiced. [6] Moreover, in cases based upon
the commission of certain types of crimes, evidence of similar
conduct of the defendant with the same person who is named
in the information or indictment "is admissible to show the
disposition of the defendant to commit the act charged and
the probability of his having committed it." (People v.
Jewett, 84 Ca1.App.2d 276. 279 [190 P.2d 330] and cases
there collected.) 1'his rule has been applied in prosecutions
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for sex crimes, and upon a charge of pimping. (People v.
Bellamy, 79 Cal.App. 160 [248 P. 1042].) The reasons for
applying that rule where the charge is furnishing narcotics
to a minor are just as compelling as in sex cases.
[7] Upon cross-examination of Sykes it was proper to ask
if he had ever had narcotics in his possession. Sykes was
charged with giving narcotics to Beverly. Previously Sykes
had repeatedly denied in broad terms the commission of the
crime. In such circumstances, the permissible scope of crossexamination is very wide. (People v. Zerillo, 36 Ca1.2d 222,
229 [223 P.2d 223].) The evidence that at prior times he had
narcotics in his possession was admissible to show familiarity
with them.
[8] It is contended that the testimony which brought out
the admission by Mercado of the theft of heroin from Sykes
was highly prejudicial. But, the only effect such evidence
could have had on the case against Sykes was to show the
previous possession of narcotics by him. As such possession
had already been admitted by Sykes in previous testimony,
the admission of Mercado's statement on this point was harm.
less. (People v. Cohen, 94 Cal.App.2d 451, 456 [210 P.2d
911] ; People v. Booth, 72 Cal.App. 160, 166 [236 P. 987].)
Upon direct examination Mercado was asked, "Did Jack
Sykes ever furnish you with marijuana '" Mercado replied,
"No, sir." Claiming that he was surprised by this reply the
district attorney asked leave to impeach the witness. An
objection upon the grounds that Mercado was the prosecution's own witness was overruled, the trial judge stating that
he might be impeached if surprise were shown and a foundation laid for that purpose. Mercado then was asked if he
had pleaded guilty, in a joint indictment with Sykes, to a
charge of giving narcotics to Beverly. He replied that he
had. He further explained that he had been arrested in
another state, brought to California by a police officer, and
interrogated by the prosecuting attorney before entering the
plea of guilty. Mercado testified that he told both of these
men that Sykes had given him a marijuana cigarette which
he had passed on to Beverly. But he told the police officer
this, he said, because he had a grievance against Sykes
and was lying when he made the same statement to the
prosecuting attorney. The only objection to any of these
questions was that one of them had already been asked and
answered. This objection was overruled.
Sykes admits that the prosecution was entitled to impeach
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Mercado but argues that the method of doing so was improper. He contends that by these questions the prosecution
was permitted to draw the admission from Mercado that he
had pleaded guilty and thus impeached his credibility by
showing bad character. He asserts that the police officer and
the prosecuting attorney were both available to give testimony
as to the prior inconsistent sti'l.tements.
The party producing a wit ness is not allowed to im·
peach his credibility by evidence of bad character, but it
may be shown that he has made prior statements inconsistent
with his present testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2049.)
" [B] ut before this can be done the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of times, places, and
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. . • ." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2052.) [9] The officer and the prosecuting
attorney could not be asked about the prior statements until
the foundation questions had been asked of Mercado. Once
he admitted the inconsistent statements, it would have been
error to introduce other evidence of them (See: People v.
Pianezzi, 42 Cal.App.2d 265, 272 [108 P.2d 732].)
It is unnecessary to decide whether the question regarding the guilty plea was properly a part of the foundation for impeaching Mercado. If it were error, it could have
been remedied by an admonition to the jury to disregard it.
However, no objection to the question was made. [10] On
the contrary, on cross·examination by counsel for Sykes, Mercado was asked if he wished to explain why he had stated to
the prosecuting attorney that he had given a marijuana cigarette to Sykes or Beverly. Mercado then related at length
the events leading to the entry of his plea of guilty, attempting to show that this statement was part of the transaction in
which he was induced to plead guilty to the charge of furnishing marijuana to Beverly in order to escape prosecution
upon two other charges. In these circumstances, Sykes cannot now complain that he was prejudiced.
[11] S'yk(~s complains of assertedly prejudicial remarks of
the district attorney in his opening and closing arguments.
Without determining whether the references to pimping and
narcotics were improper, they do not constitute grounds for
reversal. "No objection was made to the argument. It was
not assigned as miscomluct. The court was not requested to
instruct the jury to disregard it. Under these circumstances
appellant waived his objection to the challenged statementi
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(case cited) and the misconduct if any will not warrant
reversal." (People v. Jones, 91 Cal.App.2d 501 [205 P.2d
437]; also see People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.App.2d 243 [121
P.2d 529] ; People v.Lew, 78 Ca1.App.2d 175 [177 P.2d 60].)
Other points made by Sykes concern the asserted lack of
proof of the corpus delicti, and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The testimony of Beverly,
if believed, is ample to prove the elements of the crime charged
and fully supports the judgment of conviction.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
p-

SCHA DER, J., Dissenting.-In my view the opinion prepared for the District Court of Appeal by Presiding Justice
Peters and concurred in by Justices Bray and Wood (Fred B.)
(reported in (Ca1.App.) 273 P.2d 588) adequately discusses
and correctly resolves all issues of law presented on this appeal.
For the reasons therein stated it is my conclusion that the
defendant was deprived of a fair trial and that the judgment
of conviction should be reversed.

t

I

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Defendant was jointly indicted
with Rudy Mercado on one count of furnishing marijuana to
Beverly Detrick, a minor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11714.)
Mercado pleaded guilty, and defendant was convicted after
a trial before a jury. Beverly testified that defendant shared
one marijuana cigarette with her and others present on the
occasion on which the indictment was based and that he
shared another cigarette with her and another person a night
or two later. She did not pay defendant for the puffs she
took from his cigarettes. Defendant admitted that he knew
Beverly but denied that he had ever given her any marijuana
or shared any marijuana cigarettes with her. Thus the only
issue in the case was whether or not defendant shared his
cigarette with Beverly on the first occasion mentioned above.
To prove its case, the prosecution was permitted to introduce
evidence over defendant's objection that a few days before the
date of the alleged crime, defendant had discussed prostitution
with Beverly and other girls and that during the next two
weeks she had engaged in prostitution for defendant on 12
occasions. Defendant secured the customers for her and
shared the proceeds with her. He did not supply her with
marijuana or discuss marijuana on any of the occasions when
took her iQ ~ for purposes of prostitati<&
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It is my opinion that this evidence that defendant was pimp.
ing for Beverly was not admissible to prove that he shared
his cigarette with her and could serve only to prejudice the
jury against him and induce them to convict him, not because
he was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial, but be·
cause he was a pimp.·
Although the rule with respect to the admission of evidence
of crimes other than the one charged in a criminal prose cu·
tion has frequently been stated as one generally excluding evi·
dence of other crimes subject to certain recognized exceptions
(see People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 576 [145 P.2d 7]), it
is now" settled in this state that except when it shows merely
criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by
reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the
prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought to be
proved by. the defense, is admissible although it may connect
the accused with an offense not included in the charge."
(People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504,509 [218 P.2d 981] ; see also
American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence § 311; National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 55; Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 46 fIarv.L.Rev. 954 and 51 Harv.L.Rev.
988.) In the application of this test, however, the reasons for
the exclusionary rule must not be forgotten; there must be
care to avoid unnecessary prejudice to the defendant. Evidence that defendant has committed other crimes is excluded
as proof of his criminal disposition for the same reasons that
other evidence of his criminal character is excluded. "The
inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of
the issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice." (Jackson,
J., in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [69
8.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168].) "The common law has not grown
in the tradition of convicting a man and sending him to prison
because he is generally a bad man or generally regarded as
one. General bad character, much less general bad reputa·
·Since no objection was made to the evidence that defendant shared a
marijuana cigarette with Beverly on another occasion, it is unnecessary to
OCMUlidel' wbethea' that evidence would otherwise bave beea inadmj8sible.
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tion, has not yet become a criminal offense in our scheme. Our
whole tradition is that a man can be punished by criminal
sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand to be criminal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for
such misconduct." (Rutledge, J., dissenting in Michelson v.
United States, supra, 335 U.S. at p. 489.) The pr~judicial
effect of evidence of other crimes lends support to the view
that even when such evidence is directly relevant to the proof
of a material fact, the trial court should have discretion to
exclude it when its relevance is negligible as compared with
its prejudicial effect and other proof of the issue is at hand.
"This is a situation where the policy of protecting a defendant
from undue prejudice conflicts with the rule of logical relevance, and a proper determination as to which should prevail
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and not merely
on whether the evidence comes within certain categories which
constitute exceptions to the rule of exclusion." (State v.
Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367 [218 P.2d 300. 306] ; see also Adkins v.
Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258-259 [193 P. 251] ; Stone, Exclusion
of Similar Fact Evidence, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 984-985; McCormick on Evidence, § 157, pp. 332-333.) In any event
the court" should be guided by the rule that such proof is to
be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with
the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be
resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds
of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." (People
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7] ; see also People
v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 316 [169 P.2d 924] ; People v. Lane,
100 Cal. 379, 387-390 [34 P. 856]; People v. Carvalho, 112
Cal.App.2d 482, 492 [2"16 P.2d 950].)
The basic question is whether defendant's pimping is
relevant to prove only his criminal disposition or also relevant to prove facts material to the prosecution's case. For
the reasons stated above, failure of the challenged evidence
to emerge as clearly relevant compels resolution of the question in defendant's favor.
The attorney general contends that the evidence was relevant on the ground that it was defendant's scheme to reduce
Beverly to drug addiction so that he might dominate her completely as a prostitute. The majority opinion does not pass
on the validity of this contention. Instead, it moves on to
the conclusion that the evidence of pimping was relevant to
IIhow defendant's motive for sharing his cigarette with
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Beverly. The issue of defendant's motive, however, cannot
be so divorced from the contention that both crimes were part
of a common plan or scheme since, in the absence of proof
of such a plan or scheme, there is no logical basis in the
evidence for inferring that defendant's motive in sharing
his cigarette with Beverly was explained by the fact that he
was pimping for her.
It is always possible that two distinct crimes committed
by a defendant are part of a common scheme or that one
provides or illuminates the motive for the other. Were there
evidence in this case that defendant had carried out a plan
to subjugate Beverly to his will as a prostitute by reducing
her to dope addiction, it could reasonably be inferred that
his initial acts of pimping and providing marijuana were part
of that plan and that the desire to carry it through was the
motive for each of the crimes that it involved. The record is
barren of such evidence; it presents two apparently unrelated
courses of criminal conduct. It is for the prosecution to
supply the missing links; if it fails to do so, evidence conditionally admitted should be struck from the record. (People
v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, 518-519; People v. lVhiteman, 114 Cal.
338, 343 [46 P. 99]; People v. Wright, 144 Cal. 161, 165166 [77 P. 877]; People v. Darby, 64 Cal.App.2d 25, 31
(148 P.2d 28] ; State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367 [218 P.2d 300,
306] ; see also Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 [76
App.D.C. 397] ; 2 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 304, p.
205; 6 Ibid. § 1871, p. 505; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 385, 409.) Else prejudicial evidence
would be freely admitted, not for its relevance apart from
defendant's criminal disposition, but for the possibility of its
relevance to show more than the defendant's criminal disposition. What then becomes of the rule excluding evidence
that bears only on criminal disposition'
If the facts of the case in the light of human experience
do not make it reasonable to infer that one crime is evidence
of the motlve for another, evidence of the one is not admissible to prove the other. Thus, if a defendant were charged
with the murder of a woman's husband, proof of his adulterous
relation with the woman would be relevant to show the defendant's motive for killing the husband. But if the evidence showed only that he was committing adultery with a
woman who was not his victim's wife, it would not be reasonable to infer that it was relevant evidence of the motive for
tAe murdel'. It would become relevant, however, if it were
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shown that the woman's husband had desarted her and that
she had become the mistress of the defendant's victim. In
such conlleeting evidence is relevance rooted, not in the drifting sands of speculative possibilities.
Had the prosecution established the elements of the scheme
it contends existed, it would have established the relevance
of the pimping as part of that scheme and defendant's motive
for giving Beverly marijuana. In the absence of such connecting evidence, however, there is no reasonable basis for
inferring that defendant's motive ill sharing his eigarette
with Beverly was the fact that he was pimping for her.
Defendant '8 motive might have been to carry out the scheme
the prosecution did not prove existed; it might have been
no more than to share the enjoyment of the cigarette with
others present as the prosecution expert testified marijuana
smokers are wont to do; it might have been not to waste the
cigarette, for many users apparently do not like to smoke a
whole cigarette at once; conceivably it might have been to
reward Beverly for acting as a lookout at a bank robbery or
assisting him in the commission of some other crime; conceivably also it might have been to secure Beverly as a customer who would purchase narcotics from him in the future.
There is a host of possibilities.
Except for its relevance in proving defendant '8 criminal
disposition, the evidence of defendant's pimping is a neutral
quantity neither adding to nor subtracting from the prosecution's case, and since it was clearly prejudicial, its admission
should compel reversal of the judgment.
Carter, J., concurred.
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